Book Review | The Cell: Inside The 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It

CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence

Studies in Intelligence, 2004

The Cell: Inside The 9/11 Plot, and Why the FBI and CIA Failed to Stop It

John Miller and Michael Stone with Chris Mitchell. New York: Hyperion, 2002. 336 pages, no index.

Reviewed by Hayden B. Peake, curator of the CIA's Historical Intelligence Collection

In 1998, Usama Bin Laden told John Miller that he was "declaring war on the United States." "We are sure of our victory," he added (p. 4). Miller believed him. Miller had been following al-Qa`ida operations since at least 1990, when the terrorist cell that would eventually fly planes into the World Trade Center assassinated Rabbi Meir Kahane in New York. The Cell tells Miller's story in easy reading journalistic style—no table of contents, source citations, or index—and that of several FBI special agents, fire marshals, and policemen. The group, a kind of cell of a different kind, had since the early 1990s foreseen the coming of a severe terrorist attack, but they could not get their managements to take them seriously. In a risk-averse atmosphere they were frustrated and the reasons become clear in this book. While there is some overlap with other books about 9/11, the central characters are different, and there is a much more detailed account of the hijackers planning and preparations right up until they pass through airport security.

The final portion of the book covers early US military operations in Afghanistan and the hunt for Bin Laden. When one of Bin Laden's subordinates defects to the Americans he is interrogated with less than satisfactory results. Then, with White House approval, he is turned over to the Egyptians where a different method of interrogation was applied, but with no better results.

One might expect from the subtitle that the book blames the CIA and FBI for failing to stop 9/11 but that is not its approach. The authors merely point out the many turf battles and occasional failures to exchange information to emphasize their point that management was not getting the message or properly understanding the urgency.

The Cell is a worthwhile working-level view of the pre-9/11 counterterrorist problems from a New York perspective.