Counterintelligence - Espionage - Spy Case

News:

Ex-CIA official urges silence after spy 'sting'

A former high-ranking CIA official refused FBI appeals for help in tracking Chinese spies and urged others via e-mail not to cooperate because of the recent prosecution of former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Ron Montaperto. Robert G. Sutter, a former national intelligence officer for East Asia and holder of a security clearance, told a mailing list of current and former government officials that a 2003 FBI "sting" operation against Montaperto, who was convicted in June of mishandling classified documents, raised fears that he and other officials could be damaged for discussing their contacts with Chinese officials. The FBI and other U.S. counterintelligence agencies are stepping up efforts, including outreach to academics, to counter Chinese intelligence efforts after a string of damaging spy cases over the past five years, U.S. officials said.....(Washington Times, 27 Feb 07)

Spy release

Former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst Ronald Montaperto, convicted last year on espionage-related charges that involved passing secrets to China, is scheduled to get out of federal prison Sunday. Prosecutors say he will be barred from meeting any Chinese intelligence personnel as a condition of his release.....(Washington Times, 23 Feb 07)

Analyst rebuked over his support of spy for China

A senior U.S. intelligence analyst has been formally criticized for "poor judgment" after writing a letter and e-mails in support of a convicted former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst, U.S. intelligence officials said. Lonnie Henley, the deputy national intelligence officer (NIO) for East Asia, was given a letter of reprimand several months ago after an investigation within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). Mr. Henley, who could not be reached for comment, was a close friend and protege of former DIA analyst Ronald Montaperto, who was convicted in June on espionage charges that included supplying secrets to Chinese military intelligence. Mr. Henley wrote a letter to the judge supporting Montaperto, and an e-mail that criticized the FBI investigation of the former analyst…Montaperto pleaded guilty in June to charges related to illegally storing classified documents..…(Washington Times, 25 Jan 07)

Pentagon analyst gets light jail term

A former Pentagon analyst who passed highly classified intelligence to two Chinese military officers was sentenced to three months in prison yesterday -- far shy of four to five years called for in sentencing guidelines. Federal Judge Gerald Bruce Lee said that despite the "very serious charge" against Ronald Montaperto, he was swayed to reduce the sentence based on letters of support from current and former intelligence and military officials. Montaperto, 67, who pleaded guilty in June to unlawful retention of classified documents he obtained while working at the Defense Intelligence Agency, said he was trying to get intelligence for the United States from the Chinese officials….(Washington Times, 9 Sep 06)

Leak cost U.S. spy links to Chinese arms sales

…The officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said they are concerned that the analyst, Ronald Montaperto, who pleaded guilty in June to relatively minor charges related to classified document mishandling, is not being punished properly. They say both prosecutors and the judge, Judge Gerald Bruce Lee, are not aware of the damage done by Montaperto's disclosures. Montaperto, a Pentagon employee from 1981 until his 2003 dismissal, is being sentenced today in U.S. District Court in Alexandria. Court papers show that Montaperto admitted he disclosed classified information to Chinese military intelligence officers from 1989 to 2001 but said he could not recall specifics….(Washington Times, 8 Sep 06)

Damage assessment
Congress has been asked to conduct a damage assessment of the intelligence compromise caused by former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst Ronald N. Montaperto, who pleaded guilty last month to illegally retaining classified information and who told investigators he passed secrets to China….(Washington Times, 14 Jul 06)

Intelligence analyst probed over ties to a spy for China

A high-ranking U.S. intelligence analyst is facing an internal probe for his support of former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst Ron Montaperto, who recently pleaded guilty to an espionage-related charge involving contacts with Chinese intelligence….(Washington Times, 6 Jul 06)

Friends rallying to defend former DIA China specialist

A senior intelligence official is leading an effort within the Bush administration to defend former Defense Intelligence Agency China specialist Ronald Montaperto, who pleaded guilty recently to espionage-related charges involving Chinese intelligence.  Lonnie Henley, a friend of Montaperto and another former DIA China specialist, has written e-mails and had telephone conversations with intelligence and policy officials criticizing the FBI investigation and seeking to downplay the damage caused by Montaperto's 22 years of contacts with two Chinese military intelligence officers, according to officials familiar with the private support program….(Washington Times, 5 Jul 06)

Ex-DIA analyst admits passing secrets to China

A former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst has pleaded guilty to illegally holding classified documents and admitted in a plea agreement to passing "top secret" information to Chinese intelligence officials. Ronald N. Montaperto, the former analyst who held a security clearance as a China specialist at a U.S. Pacific Command research center until 2004, pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful retention of national defense information, according to court papers and law officials familiar with the case, who spoke on the condition of anonymity…..(Washington Times, 23 Jun 06)

EX-DIA ANALYST ADMITS PASSING SECRETS TO CHINA
By Bill Gertz, THE WASHINGTON TIMES

June 23, 2006

A former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst has pleaded guilty to illegally holding classified documents and admitted in a plea agreement to passing "top secret" information to Chinese intelligence officials.

    Ronald N. Montaperto, the former analyst who held a security clearance as a China specialist at a U.S. Pacific Command research center until 2004, pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful retention of national defense information, according to court papers and law officials familiar with the case, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

    "Montaperto admitted to verbally providing [Chinese military] attaches a considerable amount of information that was useful to them, including classified information," according to a statement of facts submitted in the case.

    Montaperto told investigators he could not recall specific information he gave Chinese attaches Col. Yang Qiming, Col. Yu Zhenghe and other Chinese officers during his 22-year career in government. But the statement said it included both "secret" and "top secret" data. It also said he had close unauthorized relationships with the two officers.

    The guilty plea was part of an agreement reached Wednesday in U.S. District Court in Alexandria. The conviction can carry fines of up to $250,000 and a prison term of up to 10 years. Sentencing is set for Sept. 8.

    A Pentagon official said Montaperto's value to China included both the secrets he shared and his role facilitating Chinese deception of U.S. intelligence by providing feedback on how those efforts were working.

    A senior U.S. intelligence official bluntly stated, "He was a spy for China."

    During questioning by investigators in Hawaii in 2003, where he was dean of the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Montaperto said he verbally gave Col. Yang and Col. Yu both "secret" and "top secret" information, the statement said.

    "He admitted to passing classified information to military attaches who the FBI determined were Chinese intelligence officials," said a law-enforcement official involved in the case.

    Montaperto, 66, joined the DIA in 1981 and eight years later sought a post at the CIA that eventually led to suspicions he was a spy for China. An investigation of his links to Chinese intelligence in 1991 was dropped for lack of evidence.

    He had been part of a DIA program involving authorized contacts with Chinese embassy officials. However, the statement said Montaperto failed to report his contacts, as required by security rules.

    After leaving DIA, Montaperto continued in government at the National Defense University and then became the dean of the Pacific Command think tank until his dismissal in 2004.

    A second investigation that led to his guilty plea was started in August 2001 and led to the discovery of classified documents in his Springfield residence.

    Reached by telephone Monday at his home in Morehead City, N.C., before the plea agreement was finalized, Mr. Montaperto declined to comment.

    Investigators from the FBI and Naval Criminal Investigative Service started a sting operation in July 2003 that involved asking Montaperto to join a China-related intelligence program that required him to undergo polygraph testing. Under questioning prior to the test, he made the admissions about passing secrets to China, the statement said.

    The information supplied to the Chinese included top secret details of the sale of Chinese military equipment and missiles to the Middle East, the statement said.

    The plea agreement requires Montaperto undergo debriefings and forbids him any contact with foreign agents. "He's already given a lot of information," one official said.

    According to U.S. intelligence officials, Montaperto was among a number of U.S. intelligence officials who came under suspicion of being informants following the defection of a Chinese intelligence official in the late 1980s. The defector revealed that Beijing had successfully developed five to 10 clandestine sources of information here.

    Montaperto also was part of an influential group of pro-China academics and officials in the U.S. policy and intelligence community who share similar benign views of China. The group, dubbed the Red Team by critics, harshly criticizes anyone who raises questions about the threat posed by Beijing's communist regime.
 

Inside the Ring

By Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough

February 13, 2004

China Hand Ousted

China specialist Ronald Montaperto, a former Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) analyst once investigated on suspicion of being a spy for China, has been placed on leave from the Pacific Command's Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, we have learned.

Mr. Montaperto's departure from the Hawaii-based defense think tank was the result of a "personnel action," said a Pacific Command official, who declined to comment further, citing privacy concerns.

Another official said Mr. Montaperto's departure was the result of "security-related concerns."

No other details were available on the circumstances related to the departure. But defense officials tell us Mr. Montaperto recently tried unsuccessfully to regain a position at the National Defense University's Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs.

Mr. Montaperto came under suspicion of being a Chinese spy after a Chinese government official defected to the United States after the 1989 Tiananmen massacre. The defector told U.S. intelligence that China had successfully developed five to 10 clandestine sources of information here.

FBI counterspies suspected Mr. Montaperto was one of them when he worked in the DIA's China section. He had developed a close personal friendship with a Chinese major general, Yu Zhenghe, an air attache at the Chinese Embassy in Washington.

Mr. Montaperto was later cleared by investigators.

One official said Mr. Montaperto may have been dismissed from the Pentagon think tank in Hawaii as part of the expanding counterintelligence investigation of Katrina Leung, a Chinese-American socialite who worked as an FBI informant and who is accused of being a double agent who supplied secret documents to China.

Mr. Montaperto, who was dean of academics at the center, could not be reached for comment.

China plan nixed, February 25, 2000

Pentagon officials recently rejected a proposal drawn up by Ronald Montaperto, chief Sinophile at the National Defense University (NDU), for a congressionally mandated center to study the threat posed by China.

Officials familiar with the plan said Mr. Montaperto's proposal lost out because it would have produced the exact opposite of what was called for in legislation that authorized the center.

Instead of providing members of Congress with a place to go for unfiltered intelligence about China, the Montaperto-designed center would have become what critics called an "anti-threat'' center. It would downplay the Chinese military threat, like missile deployments and new weapons purchases.

The $3 million proposal called for setting up offices outside the NDU complex at Fort McNair. It also funded a staff of 33 experts, many former military attaches, but all vetted for their views on China by Mr. Montaperto. Mr. Montaperto also was rejected as the proposed center's director because the legislation requires someone with Chinese language skills.

"The Montaperto plan was even too extreme for the Clinton administration,'' one official told us.

Mr. Montaperto has a reputation for being an apologist for Beijing. In 1996 he agreed with Chinese Defense Minister Gen. Chi Haotien, who embarrassed his Pentagon hosts during a speech at NDU by saying no one died during the 1989 Tiananmen massacre.

Even the State Department, known for its soft line toward Beijing, rejected Gen. Chi's remarks, saying "many people died in Tiananmen.''

By rejecting the Montaperto plan, the Pentagon has put the NDU chief, Gen. Richard Chilcoat, out on a limb. Under the law establishing the center, he has until Wednesday to come up with another plan.

Asked about the proposal, Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon said officials "are in the process of discussing the possibilities (for the center) with NDU.''

What about the deadline? "We're not at March 1,'' he said.

And speaking of intelligence on China, some defense officials were heartened that longtime Sinophile John Nixon retired last month as the Defense Intelligence Agency's top China analyst.

The bad news, however, is that another pro-China analyst and Nixon protégé is getting the job. Army Lt. Col. Lonnie Henley is expected to assume Mr. Nixon's former post of defense intelligence officer for East Asia in the near future, a spokeswoman said.

November 13, 2000
Beijing's spies gain access to secrets

'Panda huggers' tilt U.S. policy

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Missteps and appeasement by the U.S. government helped China develop into a dangerous global power, according to "The China Threat: How the People's Republic Targets America" (Regnery), a new book by Bill Gertz, national security reporter for The Washington Times. In the first of three excerpts, he details the hunt for Chinese spies burrowed deep inside the U.S. government.

In the early 1990s, the FBI came across evidence that amounted to a counterspy's worst nightmare: Classified reports showed communist China was running several "assets'' - spies, in the vernacular - who operated clandestinely inside the U.S. government.

One spy, however, was different from the others. He didn't work for just any agency. He had burrowed deep inside the U.S. intelligence community, meaning that the People's Republic of China had access to vital secrets.

The information was revealed to FBI counterintelligence agents in highly sensitive communications intercepts between the Chinese Embassy in Washington and Chinese intelligence officers in Beijing. The intercepts suggested the agent was supplying the Chinese with classified defense information.

The spy's code name was "Ma'' - Chinese for ``horse.''

A Chinese government official who defected to the United States after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 also told U.S. intelligence that China had successfully developed five to 10 clandestine sources of information here.

The defector said these agents were known as ``Dear Friends'' of China. And one had access to the most sensitive U.S. intelligence data, known as Top Secret-Sensitive Compartmented Information, or SCI.

FBI counterintelligence agents' search for this Chinese "mole'' led to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Pentagon's intelligence arm. A key suspect emerged: Ronald Montaperto.

At the time, Mr. Montaperto was a senior DIA analyst specializing in "estimates,'' or analyses, of matters related to China and East Asia. His job required making official contacts with Chinese government and military officials. In Washington, that meant defense attaches posted to the Chinese Embassy.

Chinese defense attaches are officers who work for the military intelligence department of the People's Liberation Army's General Staff. One was PLA Maj. Gen. Yu Zhenghe, the air attache, who had developed a close relationship with Mr. Montaperto - close enough to be invited to his wedding in 1990.

WARNINGS BY DEFECTORS

This hunt for a Chinese mole was rare for the FBI. Most of the other moles uncovered inside the U.S. government during the 1980s, in what became known as the ``Decade of the Spy,'' were spies for the Soviet Union. There was one exception: A Chinese intelligence officer who defected to the United States in 1985 identified a Chinese language specialist for the U.S. government as a spy.

The defector was Yu Qiangsheng, a senior intelligence officer in the Ministry of State Security. Mr. Yu had extensive access to information about Chinese intelligence operations and agents. It was Mr. Yu who first put a CIA counterspy on to Larry Wu-Tai Chin, the Chinese language specialist, who worked for the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service. The service publishes translations of foreign news publications and broadcasts.

Mr. Yu, who was resettled in the United States, remains under federal protection. He fears for his life because of Beijing agents.

Mr. Chin eventually was unmasked. He had burrowed within the CIA for about 30 years, passing valuable political intelligence to Beijing. He was a rare catch, but before he could be interrogated thoroughly for ``damage assessment,'' he committed suicide in his jail cell.

After the bloody military crackdown on protesters in Beijing's Tiananmen Square, several other Chinese intelligence officers defected, determined to help the United States defeat the Communist government. Two had worked inside the Chinese Embassy in Washington.

The defectors' information helped to confirm and update what Mr. Yu had provided years earlier. They explained the care with which Chinese intelligence contacted and serviced its clandestine agents. For instance, intelligence officers never met their agents inside the United States because the FBI was considered too good at catching spies. It was safer to meet abroad, preferably in China.

These defectors had access to intelligence reports - sent from the embassy to Ministry of State Security headquarters in China - that revealed that Chinese intelligence had recruited several agents who were referred to as ``Dear Friends.'' The Dear Friends were rewarded for valuable intelligence with paid trips to China, business opportunities there and prestige-building access to senior Chinese officials.

From their knowledge of the Chinese Embassy's intelligence cables, the defectors were able to tell U.S. intelligence debriefers about details China obtained from the Dear Friends. The U.S. counterspies were troubled that large amounts of extremely sensitive military intelligence was being provided to China.

INTERROGATING A SUSPECT

Based on the defectors' testimony, the FBI began a major espionage probe.

The bureau came up with a list of 12 suspects that fit the profile of the Dear Friend with access to U.S. military secrets.

During systematic ``interviews'' of each suspect, FBI agents met with Mr. Montaperto in late 1991 or early 1992. At the time, he was chief of DIA's estimates branch for China, a job he held from September 1989 until his departure in February 1992. He had joined DIA as an analyst in October 1981 and worked his way up.

Intelligence intercepts of Chinese government communications gathered by the National Security Agency and supplied to the FBI later revealed that one of the most important agents being run by Chinese intelligence was code-named Ma.

FBI agents eventually confronted Mr. Montaperto during what the bureau called ``hostile interrogations'' over the course of three meetings. They asked bluntly whether he had passed classified intelligence information to China's intelligence service.

No, Mr. Montaperto replied. He said any contacts with Chinese intelligence were authorized. He did conceded to the DIA that he knew Gen. Yu, the Chinese intelligence officer.

The FBI cleared Mr. Montaperto, though some counterintelligence officials still suspected he was Ma but couldn't prove it. The matter was put to rest conclusively, Mr. Montaperto said.

``I can honestly say they looked me in the eye and said, `We don't think you're a spy,' '' he said of the meetings with FBI agents.

But soon after the investigation, Mr. Montaperto left the DIA. In an interview with this reporter, he said the FBI probe had nothing to do with his departure. As for his friendship with Gen. Yu, he said: ``One does not have friends with Chinese officials'' - meaning his contacts were strictly professional.

``Did General Yu attend your wedding?'' this reporter asked. ``Yes,'' Mr. Montaperto said.

It was a relatively small wedding, he said, because it was his second marriage. He said he invited Gen. Yu and other Chinese officials because he thought it would be a good experience for them.

Hanging on the wall inside Mr. Montaperto's office was a large scroll of Chinese calligraphy. It contained the characters ``horse dragon virtue,'' which when spoken in Mandarin sound like ``Montaperto.'' A second set of characters on the scroll are Chinese for ``war horse.''

The scroll is signed by a Chinese intelligence officer, who, like Yu Zhenghe, was an attache at the Chinese Embassy in Washington when Mr. Montaperto received the scroll as a gift. Mr. Montaperto says a student in Shanghai gave it to him.

A PANDA HUGGER?

The FBI never found the clandestine spy known as Ma. The bureau did uncover several Dear Friends, but did not seek prosecution. The FBI was hamstrung by the limited details provided by the former Chinese intelligence officers, who had seen the cables but did not have hard copies.

One Chinese agent was a Chinese-American employee at a U.S. defense contractor in Northern Virginia. Although he was not prosecuted, his access to classified information was cut off.

Mr. Montaperto next went to work at the Pentagon's National Defense University at Fort McNair, a scenic base overlooking the Potomac River in Southwest Washington. He became a ``social science analyst'' with the university's Institute for National Strategic Studies, a think tank for security issues.

Mr. Montaperto's biography as posted on the university's Internet site contains only four sentences and makes no mention of his DIA experience. It states only that he is a China affairs specialist: ``Currently he is defining strategies and policies for managing future U.S. interests in the Asia- Pacific region.''

Because the FBI could not prove its suspicions, Mr. Montaperto was allowed to retain his top-secret security clearance. But he does not have the same access to intelligence information as he had at DIA.

Gen. Yu, meanwhile, remains one of China's most important intelligence officers. He works for Gen. Xiong Guangkai, the PLA's deputy chief of staff for intelligence.

According to one U.S. national security official, Gen. Xiong returned to the United States in 1996 during the Taiwan Strait crisis and tried to meet Mr. Montaperto. The crisis was prompted by test firings of Chinese missiles near Taiwan; the United States dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the region.

Mr. Montaperto's primary job at the government's National Defense University is to oversee the China portion of an annual ``Strategic Assessment,'' to speak on China policy around the world and to organize an occasional conference on China. His pronounced pro-China view plays down that nation's military capabilities, specifically its development of strategic and conventional forces.

But Mr. Montaperto says he is no ``panda hugger,'' using the derogatory term China specialists at the Pentagon employ for soft-liners.

``For some people, I will always be considered a panda hugger,'' he added.

`HIDE BRIGHTNESS'

When Congress ordered creation of a National Defense University clearinghouse for intelligence on the People's Liberation Army, Mr. Montaperto presented the plan to the Pentagon. It called for hiring 33 specialists, opening a large office in Southwest and spending $4.5 million a year.

At first the Pentagon rejected the plan because it appeared to promote military-to-military contacts with the PLA rather than provide useful information about the strategy and direction of the Chinese military.

The Clinton administration already had dramatically increased meetings and exchanges with Chinese military leaders, which the Chinese exploited to develop intelligence. Many in the Pentagon had had enough of that, and senior officials objected to Mr. Montaperto's appointment as director of the new center. But the university named him director anyway.

The importance of the center was highlighted when Mr. Clinton opposed the requirement to set it up.

By mandating the center and reports on China's military buildup, Congress assumes ``an outcome that is far from foreordained - that China is bent on becoming a military threat to the United States,'' the president said in signing a $289 billion defense bill in October 1999. ``I believe we should not make it more likely that China will choose this path by acting as if the decision has already been made.''

Yet the president's policies and those of the soft-liners who refused to recognize the nature of the People's Republic of China had done more to increase the danger from China than any of the skeptics in Congress who believed more should be done to learn about the Communist regime's military intentions.

Mr. Montaperto's minimizing of the threat is at one with Chinese military policy, which involves deception - preventing the U.S. ``hegemon'' from recognizing China's emerging power until it is greater, at least regionally, than that of the United States.

The late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping said China must avoid provoking a conflict with the United States until China has the military, economic and political power to win.

In the words of Mr. Deng: ``Hide brightness; nourish obscurity.'' Or as the official translation in Beijing put it, ``Bide our time and build up our capabilities.''

FRIENDLY `SPECIALISTS'

Chinese military writings predict a ``dangerous decade'' - when that nation faces a strategic checkmate - between 2020 and 2030. By 2020, the United States will not be able to ignore China's growing might. But China's military and strategic planners fear their country will not be powerful enough to take on the United States until 2030.

What China wanted was three more decades of Clinton-style ``engagement,'' a policy that downplays Chinese military capabilities, encourages decreasing U.S. defense spending and gives China major technical and financial boosts. Chinese officials view certain specialists in the United States as important outlets for Beijing's views. Many of these China specialists are current or former government officials.

Unlike the thousands of political scientists who specialize in European and Russian affairs, the China experts who specialize in international security and foreign affairs could fit in a large conference room. And most of them communicate via Internet discussion groups, a major target of influence exerted by the Chinese government.

Take ``Chinasec.'' Every morning, a group of about 100 high-level U.S. policy-makers and intelligence officials receives e-mail postings as part of this Internet discussion group, whose innocuous-sounding name stands for ``China security.''

The informal electronic gathering includes some of the most important China policy-makers in the U.S. government, including the Pentagon's desk officer for China matters, Col. John Corbett. The group is decidedly pro- China and often criticizes news articles - in particular this reporter's work for The Washington Times - that explore Chinese weapons sales to rogue states or espionage against the United States.

For instance, when The Times reported on the critical views of China held by Condoleeza Rice, a key foreign policy adviser to Republican presidential nominee George W. Bush, Chinasec swung into action. The e-mail network adopted the standard posture of the Clinton administration: spin. It dismissed the article as exaggerated and the work of a ``nonexpert.''

Chinasec's on-line discussion group is secret, but not in the sense of that term denoted by the U.S. government classification. Most of Chinasec's participants hold high-level security clearances. At least 10 CIA officials are members.

Chinasec is part of an informal but powerful network of current and former officials, academics and other China experts who exert a major influence on U.S. policies toward China.

THE LITMUS TEST

The ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote that ``supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.''

The view of China presented by these pro-Beijing specialists is not manufactured by the Chinese Communist Politburo, but it serves the Politburo's strategy. The key theme of the propaganda directed abroad is simple: China is not a threat.

The theme is central to the Chinese Communist Party's overt and covert influence efforts. It is the litmus test for those experts that Beijing labels ``Friends of China.'' And it was a constant refrain of the Clinton administration.

Despite the soft-line approach, a public opinion poll last year showed that Mr. Clinton's policy of engagement had not convinced the majority of the American people that China is a benign power.

The results of the Wall Street Journal-NBC News poll, published in September 1999, indicate that 60 percent to 80 percent consider China to be an "adversary,'' not a strategic partner.