UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DAVID HENRY BARNETT Statement of Facts

Barnett Case

In the United States District Court For the District of Maryland

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. DAVID HENRY BARNETT

RULE 11 STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case comes before the Court on a one-count indictment charging David Henry Barnett with espionage, for selling sensitive American intelligence information to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The indictment charges Barnett with a violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 794. The charge carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Section 794(a) requires that the Government prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Barnett knowingly and willfully communicated information relating to the national defense to the Soviet Union and that he did so with intent to injure the United States or give advantage to the Soviet Union.

The Government will establish this offense by showing that in 1976 and 1977 in Vienna, Austria and Jakarta, Indonesia, David Henry Barnett, a former Central Intelligence Agency employee, communicated national defense information including information about a CIA operation known as HABRINK to agents of the Soviet Committee for State Security, the KGB.

An overview of the case to be detailed is as follows: Barnett was employed by the CIA in the late 1950s and 1960s as a contract employee and staff officer. His primary responsibility involved the conduct of clandestine intelligence operations, including operations designed to collect information on the Soviet Union. Because of his position, he was given clearances up to and including Top Secret as well as several special compartmented clearances and had access to sensitive classified information, particularly concerning the CIA’s clandestine intelligence collection operations. During this period he was an undercover employee.

Barnett, however, decided in 1970 that his employment with the CIA was not sufficiently remunerative and left his employment to go into business on his own. After a few years, however, Barnett encountered significant financial difficulties in the business world and incurred substantial debts. To solve his financial difficulties, he approached the KGB in 1976 to sell them classified information that he had garnered as a CIA employee.

Over the course of the next few years, Barnett received approximately $92,600 in exchange for telling the KGB about CIA operations with which he was familiar, and the identities of numerous foreign nationals who at personal risk cooperated with the CIA by providing information of value to our nation’s security. In addition, he furnished the true identities of CIA covert employees, and the identities of persons in the employ of the Soviet Union who had been targeted by the CIA for possible recruitment. He also agreed to seek reemployment in the intelligence field at the behest of the Soviet Union to collect further national defense information.

Among the items relating to the national defense that Barnett sold the Russians was a description of a covert operation known as HABRINK, a CIA effort that procured substantial technical information concerning Soviet weaponry. It is that operation which is specified in this indictment. The operation took place in a foreign country without that country’s knowledge.

Information, other than HABRINK, that Barnett sold would have formed the basis for additional counts had the case gone to trial, and his communication of still other information would have been the subject of testimony as other acts evidencing intent. Because the Government can adequately establish the factual basis for a plea without extensive reference to these leads, the Government will submit to Court and counsel, under a protective order, an in camera sentencing memorandum detailing these items, so that the Court will be fully informed for sentencing.

The defendant claims that he did not transmit certain classified information to the Soviets. The details of that claim will also be submitted to the Court in camera by his counsel. With respect to the value of information Barnett sold, the Government does not take the position that the KGB paid $92,600 solely for the value of the information passed by Barnett. Undoubtedly, the KGB was motivated to pay this amount not only for the information obtained but also in anticipation of Barnett’s becoming re-employed in the U.S. intelligence community, or with Congressional or White House oversight committees, a re-employment that would have been of great value to the KGB.

The Government’s proof of intent would rest principally on four items:

First, Barnett’s monetary motivation;

Second, the range of information Barnett sold—he passed a significant portion of his knowledge to the Soviet Union without regard to its significance to our national defense;

Third, his own intelligence training and background that should have made him fully aware of the significance of the information he sold; and

Fourth, his clandestine manner of communicating with the KGB.

The Government’s proof includes a lengthy confession given by Barnett to the FBI during the course of twelve interviews over an eighteen day period in March and April 1980. The Government would also offer independent evidence establishing the trustworthiness of and corroborating the confession and expert testimony regarding the national defense character of the information passed.

With respect to proof of venue, it should be noted that 18 U.S.C. Section 3238 provides that if, as here, the offense is committed out of the jurisdiction of a particular State or District, the indictment may be brought in the district of the defendant’s last known residence; in this case, Maryland.

If this case were to proceed to trial, the Government would provide as follows:

The defendant was employed by the CIA as a contract employee from November 1958 through May 1960 when his contract expired. He was rehired as a contract employee in June 1961 and remained in that capacity until March 1963 when he became a staff officer of the CIA. He remained in that position until January 1970. He was again employed as a contract employee from January 1979 to March 1980.

From March 1963 until December 1965, he served as an intelligence officer in a covert capacity in a foreign country. He then returned to CIA Headquarters where he stayed until November 1967. In November 1967, he was sent to another foreign country where he was Chief of Base, a position he held until he left the CIA in January 1970 to enter private business for family reasons and to increase his income.

As Barnett later admitted, and the FBI has corroborated, after Barnett left the CIA in 1970, his business ventures proved unsuccessful and as a consequence, he became substantially indebted. During the fall of 1972, Barnett, together with his family, established residence in Indonesia for the purpose of working in private industry and starting a number of businesses. By 1976, however, Barnett’s financial situation had become quite precarious.

The Government would introduce the testimony of Lee Lok- Khoen and Jacob Vendra Syahrail, two employees of P.T. Trifoods, an Indonesian seafood processing corporation managed by Barnett in the mid-1970’s. They would testify that Barnett was authorized to and did in fact take advances at will from this corporation, in excess of $100,000, for his own personal use or for the use of C.V. Kemiri Gading, one of his then personally owned companies. Records kept by the two employees in the ordinary course of P.T. Trifoods business reflect that during 1977, after Barnett had been paid money by the KGB, the defendant repaid approximately $100,000 in advances that he or his personal companies had received. The Government is able to link $12,500 of the repayment to moneys paid Barnett by the KGB.

Barnett admits that in mid–1976, however, while he was still in the midst of these financial difficulties, he typed an unsigned note that he intended to give the Soviets when the occasion arose, setting forth his difficult financial situation, his CIA experience and training, and his willingness to sell his services to the KGB for approximately $70,000.

In the fall of 1976, Barnett went to the home of a Soviet Cultural Attaché in Jakarta, Indonesia with whom Barnett had met frequently while he had been with the Agency. As CIA records show, there had been extensive earlier contacts between this Soviet and Barnett during Barnett’s tenure with the CIA—at a time when the CIA had been assessing the possibility of recruiting this Soviet. Moreover, CIA employees would testify that this Cultural Attaché is quite accessible to American diplomatic personnel and has had frequent contact with them. Barnett gave the Soviet Attaché the note and offered to provide information relating to his former CIA employment. The Soviet requested Barnett to return the following Sunday.

That Sunday at the Soviet’s residence, Barnett was introduced to someone identified only as Dmitriy. During this meeting, Barnett outlined his financial situation, requested $70,000 and for the first time discussed CIA operations he had learned of while operating covertly for the CIA.

On a subsequent Sunday in late November 1976, Barnett again met with Dmitriy inside the Soviet compound in Jakarta and communicated more information that he had acquired during his CIA employment. For this, Dmitriy paid Barnett $25,000 in United States currency in $100, $50, and $20 bills and arranged a meeting between the defendant and the KGB in Vienna, Austria on February 27-28, 1977.

Once more before February 25, 1977, Barnett met with Dmitriy and was given an additional $3,000 for the travel expenses he would incur during his upcoming trip to Vienna. On Friday, February 25, 1977, Barnett left Jakarta for Brussels, Belgium, where he took a commuter train to Antwerp. On the 26th he had a brief unrelated meeting in Antwerp with a business associate. After the meeting, Barnett took the train first to Brussels and then to Vienna. He arrived in Vienna on the morning of the 27th. During his trip from Antwerp to Vienna, Barnett’s passport was not stamped.

Shortly after he arrived in Vienna, Barnett was met at the contact point by a man who exchanged the prearranged verbal code, known as a parole, and identified himself as Pavel. Barnett was then taken to a KGB safehouse on the outskirts of Vienna. Barnett’s meeting with the KGB in Vienna lasted eight to ten hours. He related his knowledge of national defense information to Pavel, and two other KGB agents identified only as Mike and Aleksey. Barnett also convinced the three that he could get a job in the United States which would give him access to classified information. The KGB told Barnett that their primary targets were the CIA, the Intelligence and Research Bureau at the State Department (INR) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). At the conclusion of the meeting, the defendant was paid $15,000.

On Tuesday, March 1, Barnett left Vienna by train for Brussels. Again, his passport was not stamped. After another meeting with his business associate in Antwerp, Barnett flew back to Jakarta from Brussels, arriving there on March 3 or 4, 1977.

In late March 1977, Barnett met again with Dmitriy in Jakarta. Dmitriy paid him an additional $30,000 and again instructed him to obtain a job in the United States with access to national defense information. As business records show, Barnett repaid P.T. Trifoods, the company he managed, $5,000 on March 29 and $7,500 on March 31. Barnett admits this money came from the KGB.

Barnett also admits that before flying to the United States on June 16, 1977, he met with Dmitriy and was paid $3,000 for expenses for his upcoming trip to the United States to search for a job. Barnett was in the United States from June 16 to July 3. While in Washington, Barnett called David Kenny, a State Department employee, about obtaining a job on the White House Intelligence Oversight Board. Barnett subsequently reported his effort to Dmitriy.

Approximately July 10, 1977, after his return to Indonesia, Barnett met with Dmitriy and Pavel. Barnett falsely told Pavel that during his last trip to Washington, he had met with a senior CIA official. However, Barnett mentioned that he was afraid to become reemployed with the CIA because he felt that he could not pass the polygraph examination required for staff employment with the Agency. Nonetheless, the KGB instructed him to obtain a position in the CIA, INR or DIA. Barnett was given $3,000 for travel expenses to return to Washington for another attempt to find a job.

On August 11, 1977, Barnett traveled to Washington, D.C. While in Washington, he met with Joseph Dennin, General Counsel of the White House Intelligence Oversight Board, and with William Miller, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and applied for jobs on those committees. The Government would call Mr. Dennin and Mr. Miller to confirm that Barnett unsuccessfully sought employment in those sensitive organizations.

Barnett returned to Jakarta on September 5, 1977. On Wednesday following his arrival, he met with Dmitriy. During this meeting, Barnett claims he falsely told Dmitriy that he had obtained a job on the “White House Oversight Committee.” He also met with Dmitriy sometime between late September and early November and received approximately $3,600 for packing and moving expenses back to the United States.

Barnett’s travels to meet with members of the KGB during 1977 are corroborated in large part by an examination of the defendant’s passports. Robert G. Lockard, Chief of the Forensic Document Laboratory in the Immigration and Naturalization Service, would testify that Barnett’s passports show either an entry or exit on February 25, 1977 from Indonesia and another entry into that country on March 4, 1977, the dates coinciding accurately with the dates on which he admits he traveled from that country to Vienna and returned. The absence of European entries reflected on his passport also corroborates Barnett’s statements that no European passport entries had been made during his trip to Vienna. The passport also reflects two departures from and entries into Indonesia during the summer of 1977, the time when Barnett states that he traveled to the United States to obtain a job with access to intelligence information.

In November 1977, in Jakarta, Barnett was introduced by Dmitriy to a Soviet who identified himself only as Igor. Igor claimed to be stationed in America and explained that he would be working with Barnett in Washington. Igor also mentioned that he lived in a Virginia apartment complex owned by Shannon and Luchs. During that meeting, Igor gave Barnett the location of two public telephones near an Exxon station at 7336 Little River Turnpike, Annandale, Virginia, which were to be used for contact purposes at 3:00 p.m. on the last Saturday of every month. Igor also arranged a dead drop site near Lock 11 along the C&O Canal. Barnett was instructed to place a piece of red tape on the side of a nearby telephone booth to signal the KGB that the drop site had been serviced. Neither the two phone booths in Annandale nor the dead drop site, however, was ever used by Barnett.

During one of the FBI interviews, Barnett was shown a photograph of Vladimir V. Popov, a former Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C., and identified Igor as Popov. The Government would offer further evidence establishing that the “Igor” Barnett met in November was, in fact, Vladimir V. Popov, former Third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. As noted, Igor mentioned that he lived in a Shannon and Luchs apartment in northern Virginia in 1977. A copy of the lease for apartment 830, 1200 South Courthouse Road, Arlington, Virginia, an apartment managed by Shannon & Luchs, shows the lessee to be Vladimir Popov. To corroborate the fact that Popov met with the defendant in Jakarta in November 1977, the Government would also introduce two I-94 forms from the Immigration and Naturalization Service showing that Popov departed Dulles Airport on November 22, 1977 for Moscow and returned on December 6, 1977. Testimony from the CIA would establish that Barnett would not have had any reason to know Popov or his whereabouts from Barnett’s employment with the CIA.

On April 21, 1978, Barnett returned to the United States and established residence in Bethesda, Maryland, where he resides today. Between April 1978, and January 1979, Barnett sought jobs both in the intelligence field and in the private sector. Barnett, for example, admits meeting with Richard Anderson, an employee of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), in Washington to discuss employment possibilities. Mr. Richard D. Anderson, Jr., Professional Staff Member on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), would testify that Barnett called him in September 1978, regarding the possibility of obtaining a position on the HPSCI. The two met on September 27, 1978, and Barnett told Anderson that he “was well fixed for funds” and that his interest in the committee was a matter of personal interest rather than salary. Mr. Anderson, however, informed Barnett that there were no vacancies on the committee. Anderson would also testify that had Barnett obtained a position on the committee, he probably would have had access to information relating to CIA covert operations.

Despite this job-seeking effort, Barnett did not contact the KGB during this time. In January 1979, Barnett was rehired by the CIA as a contract employee to train CIA employees in operational tradecraft, on a part-time basis at a wage of $200 a day. This position, which did not provide him with access to CIA records and files, did provide him with access to some classified information.

Because Barnett was still in dire financial straits, he traveled on March 31 from Maryland back to Indonesia. On his arrival, he went to the residence of the Soviet Attaché in Jakarta to reestablish contacts with the KGB. He told the Soviet that if the KGB wanted to contact him, they should meet him at 9:00 p.m. at the same place where Barnett first met Dmitriy. When no one appeared, Barnett returned to the attaché’s residence where he met for an hour with another Soviet identified to Barnett only as Bob. According to Barnett, he told Bob of his experiences since his return to the United States and provided a general description of his new position with the CIA.

Two days later, Barnett says that he met with Bob again. During this session, Bob reiterated Igor’s instructions given during the November 1977, meeting, by urging the defendant to use the emergency contact plan on the last Saturday of each month if a need arose. Barnett, however, told Bob that he did not feel that Igor’s contact plan was secure and provided the number to a public telephone located at the Bethesda Medical Building on Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland. He later discovered, however, that he had transposed the first two numbers to this telephone number. As a result, Barnett was never able to use the emergency contact procedure. Arrangements were also made with Bob for another meeting with the KGB at the same location for June 30, 1979. At the conclusion of the meeting, Bob paid Barnett $4,000 for expenses.

Barnett returned to the United States on April 14, 1979. On June 30, 1979, as instructed by the KGB, Barnett traveled back to Jakarta, and met with another Soviet, identified only as George, in the Soviet compound. During this meeting, which lasted approximately two days, Barnett described his new position with the CIA, offered to photograph the training manual and to use the deaddrop site to transfer the information, and gave the correct number to the public telephone booth at the Bethesda Medical Building. The Government is not taking the position that these manuals had substantial significance. George, the Soviet contact, told Barnett that if no contact were established on the last Saturday of each month, Barnett should go to the Annandale Bowling Alley on the following Sunday to meet Igor.

George stressed that Barnett should attempt to obtain a permanent position with the CIA which would give him access to more sensitive information. Barnett, however, was reluctant, feeling that he would not pass the polygraph that the CIA gives to staff employees. Barnett arranged to meet again with the KGB in late November. George paid Barnett $3,000 for expenses. As Barnett details in his confession, on the last Saturdays in September and October at 3:00 p.m., Barnett received calls at the Bethesda Medical Building from an individual whose voice he later positively identified to the FBI as belonging to Igor, the Soviet that he had met in November 1977. The exchanges between Barnett and Igor were brief, no classified information was exchanged, and the defendant told Igor that he was still looking for another job. During the October telephone contact, Barnett specified other days in December 1979, on which he could meet with the KGB should he not be able to meet at the scheduled date in November.

In his interviews with the FBI, Barnett admits traveling again to meet with the KGB in late November 1979 in Jakarta. On the day of his arrival, Barnett was picked up and taken to the Soviet compound where he met George. During the meeting, which lasted into the night and the following day, George told Barnett his present position with the CIA was of no interest to the KGB and urged Barnett to pursue actively a full time position with the CIA. The defendant also provided George with a number of a second public telephone which was to be used for future contacts and which was located at the corner of Wilson Lane and Cordell Avenue in Bethesda, Maryland. George gave Barnett $3,000 for travel and expenses, for Barnett to meet with him in Vienna on April 25, 1980. The two were to meet at 64 Taberstrausse in front of the KOCH Radio Shop in the second district.

To corroborate this fact, Leonard H. Ralston, FBI Legal Attaché, from Berne would testify that he traveled to 64 Taberstrausse in the second district. At that address is the KOCH Radio Shop. The Government would further corroborate Barnett’s dealings with the KGB in 1979, as they have been described here. His passport accurately reflects his 1979 journeys to Indonesia. Also, an American Express card slip shows his purchase of an airline ticket on November 31, 1979 from Dupont International Travel, Inc., a Washington, D.C. travel agency for one of these trips. Moreover, records of Barnett’s bank account at Riggs National Bank shows a $2,600 cash deposit on December 5, 1979, only a few days after the KGB paid him $3,000 in late November.

When Barnett returned to the United States, he was called by Igor on the first Saturday in January at the public telephone in the Bethesda Medical Building. Barnett told Igor that he was still trying to obtain a fulltime job with the CIA. Barnett also suggested that he be called at the second telephone number. The defendant also states that he was again contacted by Igor at 3:00 p.m. on the first and third Saturdays in February. The first telephone call was received at the public telephone at the corner of Cordell Avenue and Wilson Lane; the second at the Bethesda Medical Building.

According to Barnett, he told Igor in the first call that he would traveling abroad in connection with his CIA employment and gave his itinerary during the second call. During the second conversation, the defendant gave Igor the number of a telephone at the Bradley Shopping Center on Arlington Road in Bethesda which was to be used for the contact on the following Saturday, March 1, 1980. On March 1, Barnett received a telephone call at the Bradley shopping Center from Igor. During the conversation, Igor told the defendant that the KGB would not meet with Barnett during Barnett’s upcoming overseas trip for the CIA, but would meet with him in Europe as previously scheduled.

In his confession, Barnett also told the FBI that on April 5, 1980, Igor was to call him at the Bradley Shopping Center at 3:00 p.m. If the call was not completed at 3:00, Igor was to call again at 4:00 p.m. By April 5, 1980, of course, Barnett had been confronted by the FBI. However, Special Agent Michael Waguespack would testify that he went to the phone booth described on the fifth of April and heard it ring three different times between 2:58 p.m. and 3:03 p.m.

In fairness to Barnett, it should be noted that after his initial sale of information in 1976 and 1977, he did not do everything that the KGB wished. He claims that he failed to communicate with the KGB as directed between April 1978, and January 1979, in the United States. Barnett told the FBI he was fearful of detection if he operated in this country. He also failed to regain staff officer status with CIA and thus had not attained access to the type of intelligence information that the KGB primarily sought or would consider of major importance. It could well be that these failures could have caused some skepticism in the KGB about his bona fides and, retrospectively, the value of the information that he had previously sold.

In March 1980, Barnett was interviewed by the FBI about his suspected espionage activities involving the KGB, and confessed his involvement as has been described here. Special Agents Michael J. Waguespack, R. Dion Rankin, Charles T. McComas and Paul K. Minor of the FBI would testify that they interviewed the defendant either singly or in pairs on twelve occasions during the period between March 18 and April 4, 1980. They would also present testimony and FBI Advice of Rights forms establishing that Barnett’s statements were given voluntarily and that his rights under the Miranda decision and its progeny were not violated.

Barnett was first interviewed by the FBI on the morning of March 18, 1980 at his place of work. Special Agents Waguespack and Rankin would testify that they told Barnett that they wished to speak with him regarding his involvement with the KGB and that they knew he had been in contact with the KGB. At no time did the agents indicate that the defendant was under arrest or that his freedom of movement had been deprived in any way. In fact, Barnett was told that the FBI’s function was only to investigate the facts and that the Attorney General would decide whether a prosecution was warranted.

After a short discussion with the agents, Barnett began his confession. He was read his rights and signed the standard waiver form prior to his drafting and signing a written statement outlining briefly his activities with the representatives of the Soviet Union. He left his office for home after the interview.

Prior to each of the subsequent eleven interviews which all occurred in motel rooms, Barnett was read his Miranda rights and signed a standard waiver form. Barnett admitted that during his meeting with Dmitriy in the Fall of 1976 and early 1977 and his meeting with the KGB in Vienna, he communicated information relating to

(1) the details of the CIA’s collection of personality data on seven Soviet consular officials in the late 1960s, where Barnett had been Chief of Base;

(2) the identities of thirty covert CIA employees as well as personality data on some of them; and

(3) numerous CIA operations with which the defendant was familiar from his employment with the CIA, including HABRINK, the operation that forms the basis for the indictment.

Again, the details and significance of the remaining information will be discussed in an in camera sentencing memorandum.

Barnett’s access to the classified information which he confessed to having communicated to the Soviets can be proved through both CIA documents and the testimony of Barnett’s former colleagues within the CIA. Personnel records maintained at the CIA indicate that Barnett had security clearances while he was employed by the CIA and had access to the information which he confessed to having communicated to the KGB.

In particular, the CIA has documents, authored by Barnett during his employment, detailing his involvement in studies of the recruitment potential of the seven Soviets and his participation in some of those operations, the details of which he confessed to having transmitted.

Moreover, testimony from one of the defendant’s former colleagues within the CIA would establish that Barnett worked closely on the HABRINK operation, which is the subject matter of the indictment. HABRINK was a clandestine intelligence collection operation designed to obtain information on Soviet weaponry. The information was collected by utilizing a net of agents with access to information concerning sophisticated weaponry which the Soviets were, during that period, supplying to a foreign nation, whose relationships, however, at the time were very close to the Soviet Union. Recently, however, that country has enjoyed good relations with the United States. In the early 1960’s that country had begun to receive current conventional Soviet army, navy and air force weapons systems. The purpose of the HABRINK operation was to secure, without the knowledge of the government of that country or the Soviet Union, the weaponry itself or parts thereof and classified Soviet documents providing the operational characteristics and technical description of these weapons systems.

The operation was very successful and provided a large volume of Soviet documentary data and a limited amount of Soviet hardware on a large variety of weapons systems deployed in that country. The operation collected detailed information concerning the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile system, the Russian Styx naval cruise missile, and the Soviet W-class submarine. The information regarding that weaponry has never been available from any other source. Information pertaining to the KOMAR-class guided missile patrol boats, the RIGA-class destroyer, the SVERDLOV-class cruiser, the TU-16 (BADGER) bomber aircraft an the associated KENNEL air-tosurface missile systems as well as other weaponry information of lesser significance was also obtained.

One example of the importance of this operation to the national defense of this country during the late 60’s and early 70’s was the securing by HABRINK of the guidance system from an SA-2, familiarly known as a SAM missile. That missile had been used very effectively by the North Vietnamese to shoot down many U.S. aircraft. As a result of HABRINK’s obtaining the guidance system, it became possible to determine the radio frequencies used to direct the missile and jam those frequencies, resulting in the saving of the lives of many bomber crews engaged in action in Vietnam. This example is cited to demonstrate the utility of the HABRINK operation and its relationship to the national defense. The Government, however, is not attempting to argue that Barnett’s disclosure of HABRINK in 1976 had a deleterious impact on the United States with respect to that particular item of Soviet weaponry and American countermeasures.

As indicated above, this operation was run without the knowledge and consent of this foreign nation, has not been publicly disclosed and—so far as can be determined—was not known by the Soviet Union until Barnett revealed it to the KGB. The operation was run by the CIA through an individual assigned to cryptonym HABRINK/1 who had wide access to the information sought and utilized an extensive network of sub-agents who supplied him with the information desired by the United States. This agent is alive, though no longer active as a source. Barnett told the KGB HABRINK/1’s true name. The CIA has confirmed that the name Barnett admits giving to the KGB is, in fact, the agent’s true name. As a result of Barnett’s actions, HABRINK/1 is exposed to retribution if the Soviets find it to their advantage.

Clearly, Barnett knew, when he told the Soviets about HABRINK, that the operation related to the national defense and that there was a continued need to keep the operation secret. When Barnett was asked by the FBI in March 1980, if there was one event or operation that was big and that stood out in his mind, he promptly identified HABRINK. Barnett’s acknowledgment of HABRINK’s importance is further evidence of his intent.

Barnett also admits telling the Soviets that HABRINK obtained Soviet training manuals and hardware from all over the country and from air force, army and navy bases and received $300,000 for the material, being paid approximately $175 per manual. He claims not to have any recollection of which manuals were secured. However, experts from the CIA would testify that Barnett’s disclosures sufficed to alert the KGB that the compromise to the United States of the weapons supplied to that country was total. Barnett also admits that the KGB was interested in knowing where the manuals came from, when the operation started, when it ended, which agents and subagents were still in the country and the circumstances behind the termination of the operation.

Finally, he accurately revealed to the KGB that HABRINK had secured the antenna guidance system and gyroscope from the Soviet Styx missile, but the KGB for its own reasons, falsely denied that the missiles supplied had that equipment. In short, Barnett fully and accurately described his knowledge of the HABRINK operation. Barnett claims, however, that when he disclosed information about HABRINK at the Vienna meeting, Dmitriy did not question him extensively concerning the operation.

Barnett told the KGB that he had been afraid to tell them about this operation for fear they would be angered by his involvement. Dmitriy, according to Barnett, shrugged the operation off, claiming that the KGB assumed that when hardware gets out of their hands, it is compromised. According to Barnett, Dmitriy said that “the Americans got the information so they are happy, and the Soviets got the benefits from supplying the hardware in the first place, so everybody’s happy.”

To the contrary, expert testimony from the Government would establish that the decision to supply sophisticated weaponry to this nation involved was the subject of an intense internal debate within the Soviet Union. The Soviet faction opposing the supplying of these weapons argued this supplying would lead to the compromise of detailed Soviet defense information. The decision to supply the weapons was eventually made on purely political grounds. In short, the Government’s position would be that while debriefing Barnett, the KGB gave short shrift to HABRINK because it did not want to acquaint him with the value of the HABRINK operation or the value to them of learning that such an operation had taken place.

At the height of its productivity in the late 1960s, HABRINK was considered by the CIA as one of its highest priority operations. It should be noted that Barnett’s compromise of HABRINK in 1976 and 1977 was far less damaging then if it had been compromised while it was ongoing in the late 1960’s or soon after its termination in 1969. Nonetheless, Barnett’s disclosure of HABRINK to the KGB in 1976 and 1977 has military, operational and diplomatic implications for the United States.

To address the military significance of Barnett having revealed the HABRINK operation, the Government would call among its expert witnesses Rear Admiral John L. Butts of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Mr. Jerry Sydow, Program Director of the Navy Foreign Material Program, and Mr. Jay Dewing, Intelligence Officer, Physical Sciences, of the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as other military and technical witnesses.

Collectively, they would testify that among the items received by the HABRINK operation were the components of a Styx cruise missile, including the seeker and autopilot, and its wiring manuals and associated diagrams. The Styx missile is a patrol boat missile that has the demonstrated capacity of sinking a destroyer at a range of at least 15 miles. Although developed in the later 1950s and in the early 1960s, the Soviet Union still supplies the Styx to a number of thirdworld countries. The Soviet Union makes extensive use of updated and modified versions of the Styx in their own fleet. Unlike most military programs of the United States that develop new weapons systems to replace old ones, the Soviet Union frequently updates its arsenal by piecemeal modification of existing weapons. For this reason, information about the Styx missile has continuing use to the United States, even after the Soviet Union replaced it with successor weapons.

The United States benefited from HABRINK’s obtaining the Styx and related information. As a result of this information, the military refined and developed offensive and defensive countermeasures, including electronic, design, tactical and other countermeasures to a high degree of effectiveness. According to these experts, some of these countermeasures can be expected to be useful in combating the successors of the Styx.

Moreover, the HABRINK information enabled the United States to identify as ineffective other costly countermeasures previously underway and to cease those efforts. Barnett’s disclosure to the KGB that the United States got the guidance system for the Styx missile signals the Soviets that the United States has likely developed effective electronic counter measures just as it did with the SA-2 missile. As a result of Barnett’s actions, the Soviet Union may make design changes on its successor missiles intended to nullify the electronic and other countermeasures that the United States has developed. This could make the United States more vulnerable to these weapons systems.

Limitations on resources require the Soviet Union, like the United States, to select priorities in weapons development. Government experts would say, confirmation of HABRINK’s success in obtaining the Styx would make the Soviet Union’s choices more informed, since it would now definitely know that the United States possessed this information and would have developed countermeasures. In other words, should the United States become engaged in an armed confrontation with the Soviet Union or it allies who have Styx missiles or their successors, Barnett’s transmission of the information concerning HABRINK’s success may allow the Soviet Union to use those missiles more effectively against our ships where, before Barnett’s revelation, those ships might well have been able to take appropriate countermeasures.

HABRINK obtained the battery discharge curves for the Soviet W-class submarines. The W-class submarines are diesel submarines, still in use because they have certain advantages over nuclear powered submarines in certain tactical situations. The Soviet Union uses these submarines in its own arsenal. Indeed, it has continued manufacturing diesel submarines that use either the same or similar batteries. The battery discharge curves could not then have been predicted without this information. The United States learned from the discharge curves how long Soviet submarines may stay submerged. That period of time was longer than the United States had previously thought and that information was disseminated, under classification, within the American fleet.

In an engagement, a Soviet submarine commander might well make some tactical decisions if he believed the United States did not know how long he could stay submerged. The United States, in fact, having that knowledge would not be misled by those decisions and therefore could have a distinct tactical advantage in such an engagement. However, as a result of Barnett’s revelations, Soviet submarine commanders have undoubtedly been notified that the United States is aware of the discharge curves and will thus forego engaging in strategies that would erroneously attempt to take advantage of our supposed ignorance. In short, Barnett’s compromise of the information garnered by HABRINK eliminates the tactical advantage the information originally provided.

An expert witness from the Soviet East Europe Division of the Directorate of Operations of the CIA would testify concerning the operational damage done by Barnett’s transmission of this information. According to this expert, Barnett’s compromise is the first definite indication to the Soviets that the CIA has been able to obtain successfully technical information in such quantity and detail regarding Soviet military equipment supplied by the Soviets to foreign countries by means of clandestine intelligence operations conducted without the knowledge or cooperation of the government of the country involved.

As I mentioned above, the Soviets made the decision to supply this foreign nation with the sophisticated weapons for political reasons and over the objections of those factions within the Soviet Union who felt that such action could compromise sensitive weaponry information. This expert would testify that, in his judgment, the Soviets, having learned through Barnett’s revelations that CIA has such capability, may now further restrict the dissemination of technical information when it exports equipment to nonaligned nations. If this were to happen, continued access to such information by clandestine means would become exceedingly difficult.

Barnett’s revelation of this information to the Soviet Union has serious implication for our diplomatic relationship with this country. The country where this operation was carried out has definite geopolitical significance to the United States and which is one with whom this country currently enjoys a good relationship. It is also a country with natural resources important to the United States. The Soviets could use this information to the disadvantage of the United States’ relationships with the country involved.

If the Soviets were to reveal to the government of the country involved that CIA had conducted clandestine intelligence collection operations, without that country’s government’s knowledge, the country involved may well take steps to monitor and restrict essential activities there. The Soviet Union has the option of attempting to use its knowledge of this operation to damage our relationship with that country, by conveying to that country’s government the fact of, the nature of, and the extent of the HABRINK operation. The Soviets can withhold disclosure until conditions prevail that maximize the impact of disclosure. If the Soviet Union chooses to reveal this information, diplomatic relations may be soured for some period of time and the CIA’s capability in that country could be substantially curtailed.

The Government, had the case gone to trial, would have called as experts persons from the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency to describe the use that the Soviet Union could make to damage our diplomatic relations with that country.

Mr. Barnett’s awareness that the Soviet Union could make use of the HABRINK operation to the damage of the United States’ diplomatic interests is demonstrated by Barnett’s admission to the FBI that during the HABRINK operation the CIA was concerned about political implications, should the operation be exposed. Thus, Barnett must have been aware that he was giving the Soviet Union an opportunity to do exactly what had been a concern of the United States all along, and that was to avoid the diplomatic damage that would flow from its exposure.

Your honor, if the case were to go trial, the Government would present ample proof—beyond a reasonable doubt—that David Henry Barnett communicated information to the Soviet Union relating to the national defense of the United States with intent and reason to believe that the information would aid the Soviet Union and injure the United States.